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Abstract
We propose a differential game approach to analyze two–candidate competition in a`
la Hotelling game with candidates simultaneously choosing locations and investment in
valence. We find a Markov perfect equilibrium in which candidates choose divergent loca-
tions. Divergence from the median is increasing if the parameter measuring the importance
of policy relative to valence is decreasing and if valence depreciates slowly. The results are
generalizable to a version of the game with probabilistic voting, that is with a stochastic
state equation.
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1. Introduction
Seminal works of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) have predicted that in a two–
candidate competition in a one–dimensional policy space, both candidates would locate at
the median of the voters’ distribution. Since this observation does not always correspond
to empirical observations, public choice scholars have been developing theories that would
reflect the reality more closely. Most recently, authors incorporate the notion of ”valence”
into spatial models. Valence can be understood as comprising all the non–policy char-
acteristics of candidates, that affect the electoral outcome. Some of these characteristics
remain unaffected by campaign activity (e.g., looks of candidates), whereas others might
be altered during campaigns, in which parties aim to affect the views of voters with regard
to, for example, their competence or experience. Intuitively, valence is a concept similar to
goodwill in accounting and marketing science – it comprises the characteristics of a candi-
date, other than her policy, which account for the electoral success (Ko¨ppl-Turyna, 2014).
Schofield (2006) describes valence as ”the electorally perceived quality of the political lead-
ers”. Under this definition, valence can be decomposed into a time invariant component
(e.g. looks of a candidate or party specific effects unaffected by personal investments) and
the endogenous, time–varying component which can be affected by actions or expenditures
of candidates. Analysis in this paper focuses on the latter kind, but inclusion of candidate
time–fixed traits does not change any of the conclusions.
A number of works have incorporated valence into spatial models (e.g. Schofield and
Zakharov (2010), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000)). In most cases, however, valence is
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either exogenously determined, or is seen as an endogenous variable, but only in a static
set–up. We believe that this approach does not capture the time-varying component of
valence of a candidate: it is a stock variable, level of which can vary over time, and most
importantly can be affected by the actions of the candidates. Some examples of valence
affecting behavior are presented by Serra (2010): if the source of valence is competence,
candidates can obtain additional education to increase their human capital; if the source
of valence is experience, candidates can take jobs in the bureaucracy or the private sector
before running for office; if the source of valence is campaign funding, candidates can
exert effort to attract donors. These examples show the merit of understanding valence
as a stock variable: one does not need to assume that certain valence affecting actions are
taken only before the election takes place or before the policy choices are made. Experience
of candidates obviously changes over time; politicians spend time on attracting campaign
funding during their terms in office to hope for reelection, and so on. In this work we make
the first approach to modelling the decision of parties to invest in their stock of valence
in a spatial context. We do so by analyzing a two–candidate competition as a differential
game, in which both candidates can decide to invest in their stocks of valence capital.
A word of explanation is necessary to understand the modeling technique applied in
this work. Despite the fact that the game is played in continuous time, this does not mean
that the elections constantly take place. In fact, the continuous time structure allows us
to model in a natural way the capital formation process on the part of the candidates.
Eventually, we are interested in the steady–state values of the platforms and valence levels
after the initial adjustments. It is safe to assume that the election can take place after the
steady–state has actually been reached.
Our main conclusions show that the candidates adopt more divergent positions, if the
parameter measuring the importance of policy relative to valence is decreasing. Moreover,
we show the locations of candidates are more divergent, if valence depreciates slowly, and
when the candidates are more ”patient”. These results shed a new light on the problem
of electoral campaigning, and as they can only be captured in a dynamic model, however
not directly replicating any of the known results, the effect of the policy importance pa-
rameter has been identified in a static set–up (e.g. by Schofield (2007)). Moreover, our
results show that the polarization of platforms is present even if there is no difference in
valences of the candidates (indeed, in a symmetric equilibrium of our model candidates will
obtain the same level of valence). The intuition for the polarization is therefore different
from the results of Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009). In our set–up, the polariza-
tion is associated with the fact that investment in valence and policy choice are strategic
substitutes.
A few recent theoretical works deal with the idea of investment in valence and its relation
to the positions of candidates. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) examine a two–
stage game. In the first step, candidates choose platforms and later invest in costly valences.
The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization: the closer the platforms
are, the more the election outcome is affected by valence. Consequently, candidates without
policy preferences choose divergent platforms in order to avoid the competition in valence.
Although in both models the candidates have no policy preferences (they maximize votes),
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differences in valence cause them to adopt divergent positions in equilibrium. Another two–
party model with similar predictions is presented in Serra (2010), who reports a positive
relationship between platform polarization and differences in valence. Interpreting valence
as campaign funds, one can explain an empirical fact in politics: campaign spending is
positively correlated with political polarization. This relation has been observed e.g. in
the United States during the recent decades (McCarty et al., 2006).
An interpretation of valence closest to this work can be found in Schofield and Za-
kharov (2010), who interpret valence as campaign advertising. On the other hand, the
results remain in opposition to the findings of Herrera et al. (2008), who report that
binding campaign spending limits would increase polarization by eliminating one of the
incentives for moderation at the margin. In our set–up where a platform and campaigning
are strategic substitutes, a spending limit would, by restricting the possibility of valence
creation, push the parties in the direction of the median voter.
More generally, we propose inclusion of the differential game approach to modelling
electoral competition models: not only in the context of valence, but also when discussing
party effects, campaign expenditure and electoral outcomes, impact of the interest groups
on policies and so on. These, and similar topics often have a structure similar to the
model described in this work: a time–changing structure, capital investments of some kind
and variables that can be modeled using state equations such as e.g. parties’ and interest
groups’ expenditures.
This paper is structured as follows: in the next section we present a basic version of
the model in which the candidates decide only on their level of valence, but remain policy–
oriented. Section 3 presents the main model with candidates investing in valence and
their policy choices simultaneously. Section 4 presents the case when the cost of electoral
support is strictly convex and the open–loop and closed–loop solutions do not coincide.
Section 5 summarizes the implications of the results and presents hypotheses about the
relationship of the theory developed here to factual observations about the behavior of
candidates. In Section 5 we additionally further explore the novelty and usefulness of the
differential game approach in formal modeling of political games.
2. The model with investment in valence
2.1. Description of the model
The basic set–up is a standard Hotelling model, with two candidates and linear trans-
portation cost. Consider a one–dimensional policy space S[0, 1]. In the first, simplified
version of the model, we will assume that the two candidates with ideal points are located
at the ends of the political spectrum. A reader may consider this assumption as reflecting
behavior of policy–oriented candidates. Voters are uniformly distributed on the line seg-
ment, and each of them is allowed to cast one vote for either of the two candidates. We
abstract from the participation effects, by assuming that voters do not abstain: there is
full participation. The utility of a voter located at x from voting for a candidate located
at zi is given by
U(x, zi) = λi − β|x− zi|, (1)
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where λi is the valence of candidate i and β is the ”ideological cost” parameter, which
defines how strongly do the voters react to the policy relative to the valence of the party.
High β means that the platform of the candidate is relatively more important than her
valence. At this point it is important to note, that the presented basic model assumes
deterministic voting. We will relax this unrealistic assumption further on, and show that
the results can be generalized. The position of the voter indifferent between the two
candidates can be found by equating the utilities, and simple algebraic manipulation yields
a well known formula:
xi(t) =
1
2
+
λi(t)− λj(t)
2β
(2)
The position of the indifferent voter, at the same time defines the fraction of voters who
vote for the candidate located at position 0. Each candidate can invest in her stock of
valence, according to
λ˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δλi(t), (3)
where δ > 0 denotes the depreciation of the stock of valence. The positive sign of the
depreciation guarantees the stability of the system, without any investments. We assume
that the candidates maximize their discounted stream of votes, net of the cost of the
investment in valence and other operations (xi in the cost function) that form general
costs of maintaining the electoral support. The instantaneous objectives of the candidates
are therefore
pii(t) = xi(t)− C(Ii(t), xi(t)) (4)
pij(t) = 1− xi(t)− C(Ij(t), 1− xi(t)) (5)
where the cost function C(·) is C(2). In what follows, we drop the time index for simplicity
of notation. As for the signs of the derivatives, we assume that the cost of investment is
increasing and strictly convex in Ii, thus CIi , CIi,Ii > 0. The investment cost is also weakly
increasing and weakly convex in xi, the electoral support, thus Cxi ≥ 0 and Cxi,xi ≥ 0. In
sections 2 and 3 we analyze the case of linear cost and return to the case of increasing cost
in Section 4. This cost comprises the expenses related to electoral campaigning other than
the investment in valence e.g. administrative costs, costs of traveling to remote locations,
etc.1. Additionally, let us assume that the cost function is separable in Ii and xi, thus
CIi,xi = 0. A point must be raised here. The simple construction of the model assumes
that there is no additional cost of the investment in valence other than the cost of activity
itself and that the budget is unconstrained. In particular, in the simplified version of the
model, we abstract from the fact, that party might need to be forced to move away from
their ideal point, in order to raise budget for the campaigning activity, which will in turn
restrict the amount of resources available.
1An alternative interpretation of the marginal cost of xi is the loss utility of the party, due to a need
to communicate to the voters, whose ideology is far away from the ideal point of the party.
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Parties maximize their discounted stream of payoffs according to
max
Ii
T∫
0
piie
ρtdt
max
Ij
T∫
0
pije
ρtdt
s.t.
λ˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δλi(t)
λ˙j(t) = Ij(t)− δλj(t)
λi,j(0) = λ0,i,j ≥ 0
In this work, we abstract of the consideration of interdependence of valence investments
arising from e.g. negative campaigning on the part of the opponent, however such as
generalized set–up is an important next step for future research. In what follows, T can be
assumed finite or infinite, depending on the interpretation of the candidate’s behavior. If
a candidate is gathering resources to promote a certain bill, that needs to be implemented
within a finite time, the finite T is a reasonable assumption. If a candidate predicts, that
their operations will continue over an indefinite time–span, one should work with a model
for which T =∞.
2.2. Equilibrium
The current–value Hamiltonian function for candidate i is given by
Ji = xi − C(Ii, xi) + µi(Ii − δλi) + µj(Ij − δλj) (6)
and the first order conditions are
µi = CIi (7a)
µ˙i = µi(δ + ρ)− 1
2β
(1− Cxi) (7b)
λ˙i = Ii − δλi (7c)
µ˙j =
1
2β
(1− Cxi) + µj(δ + ρ) (7d)
considered together with the transversality condition. By the Mangasarian sufficiency
condition, first order conditions are sufficient for maximization, since the Hamiltonian
and the state equation are both jointly concave in λi and Ii. The Hessian matrix of the
Hamiltonian is (−CIi,Ii 0
0 − 1
(2β)2
Cxi,xi
)
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which under the assumptions is negative semi–definite2. Notice that since there is no
interaction between the state dynamics for the two candidates, equation (7d) is redundant.
Differentiating (7a) with respect to time t and substituting into (7b) together with (7c)
yield the following behavior of the locus of investment in valence. Using symmetry, it is
easy to derive the functions of behavior for candidate j, and the system is
I˙i =
2βCIi(δ + ρ)− (1− Cxi)
2βCIi,Ii
(8)
I˙j =
2βCIj(δ + ρ)− (1− C1−xi)
2βCIj ,Ij
(9)
λ˙i = Ii − δλi (10)
λ˙j = Ij − δλj (11)
(12)
Inspection of the null–isoclines reveals that the null–isoclines I˙ = 0, under given as-
sumption are always downward–sloping or constant. Given this and the fact that ˙λi,j = 0
isoclines are upward sloping, the fixed–point of the system exists, and we can linearize it
in order to determine the stability. As a matter of fact, by the results of Fershtman and
Muller (1984) assumptions of this and the next section imply that the saddle-path solution
of this game always exists and is unique. Nevertheless, for exposition purposes we will
work through the solution. The Jacobian matrix of the system is given by
J =

δ + ρ 0
Cxi,xi
(2β)2(CIi,Ii )
− Cxi,xi
(2β)2(CIi,Ii )
0 δ + ρ − Cxi,xi
(2β)2(CIi,Ii )
Cxi,xi
(2β)2(CIi,Ii )
1 0 −δ 0
0 1 0 −δ

|I˙i,j=0,λ˙i,j=0
Under the assumptions, the eigenvalues are
e1 = −δ
e2 = δ + ρ
e3,4 =
1
2
ρ±
√
CIi,IiCIj ,Ijβ
2
(
CIj ,IjCxi,xi + CIi,Ii
(
Cxi,xi + CIj ,Ijβ
2(2δ + ρ)2
))
CIi,IiCIj ,Ijβ
2
 ,
so the system is saddle–path stable. In what follows we consider the case of linear cost
of electoral support. We will turn back to analyzing the case of Cxi,xi > 0 in Section 4.
Under the assumptions, since both the system dynamics and the payoff functions of the
2The determinant is zero, if there is no cost of the electoral support or the cost is linear.
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parties are linear in the states λi,j and there is no multiplicative interaction between the
state and control variables of the parties, the open–loop solution is Markov perfect.
Proposition 1. The set of FOCs specified in (7a)-(7d), together with a transversality con-
dition µi,j(T ) = 0 if T is finite and lim inf
t→∞
eρTµi,j[λ˜i,j(T )− λi,j(t)] (catching–up optimality)
if T = ∞ determines the Markov perfect solution to the game specified. The steady–state
level of investment and valence is given by a solution to I˙i = 0 and λ˙i = 0, and it is stable
in a saddle sense. The transversality condition is satisfied since the instantaneous profit is
bounded and at the equilibrium I and µ are bounded.
2.3. Comparative Statics
The steady–state level of investment for candidate i is given by a solution to I˙i = 0
3:
C∗Ii =
1
2(δ + ρ)β
(1− Cxi). (13)
Since the marginal cost of investment is assumed to be strictly increasing, higher val-
ues of CIi correspond to higher levels of optimal investment in the steady–state. Ceteris
paribus, the steady–state level of investment is decreasing in the discount factor, the depre-
ciation rate and the rate at which voters react to the valence of the candidate as compared
to her policy. This result is hardly surprising: if the voters react strongly to a policy,
the candidates will not spend resources on the non–policy campaign information. To as-
sure a non–negative level of steady–state investment, it must be true that Cxi < 1, but
this assumption is not anyhow restricting, because it is always possible to rescale the cost
function so that this condition holds.
2.4. The model with probabilistic voting
So far we have assumed that the fraction of the voters voting for candidate i at location
0 is given by (2). For well–known reasons, the assumption of deterministic voting is not
realistic. Therefore, we shall instead analyze a model, in which the fraction of the voters
voting for candidate i includes a random component:
xSi =
1
2
+
λi − λj
2β
+ εi, (14)
and εi ∼ N(0, σ2). The kind of uncertainty imposed here can be understood similarly to
what Banks and Duggan (2005) refer to as ”stochastic partisanship”, or a random valence
shock (unlike Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) who impose uncertainty on the
median voter’s location). Therefore, voters have policy preferences that are known to the
candidates, but the voters also have preferences over the candidates unrelated to their
policy positions. That is, in our differential game, the uncertainty enters through the state
3For candidate j the parenthesis changes to 1 + Cxi
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variable in a form of a Wiener process. We shall therefore assume that the evolution of
the state variable λi is given by
dλi(t) = (Ii(t)− δλi(t))dt+ σ(x(t), λ(t), t)dw(t) (15)
and the initial condition λi,j(0) = λ0 ≥ 0. The Markov perfect solution to this problem is
given by a solution to the set of HJB equations of the form:
ρV (λi, t)− ∂tV (λi, t) = max{xi − C(xi, Ii) + ∂xiV (λi, t)(Ii − δλi)
+
1
2
tr[∂λi∂λiV (λi, t)σ(xi, λi, t)σ(xi, λi, t)
′]|Ii ≥ 0]}
It can be proven (compare, e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)) that whenever a game in question is
a linear state game, not only the open–loop equilibrium is a solution to the HJB equations
as in the deterministic case, but it is also a solution to the stochastic version of the HJB
equations. This is true, since if the game is linear in the state, the value function is also
linear in the state, and the term 1
2
tr[∂λi∂λiV (λi, t)σ(xi, λi, t)σ(xi, λi, t)
′] vanishes, which
reduces the HJB equation to the deterministic case.
Proposition 2. The open–loop solution found in (7a)-(7d) constitutes a Markov perfect
solution to the game with probabilistic voting, with state dynamics specified in (15).
3. The model with platform choice and investment in valence
3.1. Description of the model and equilibrium
In a more realistic setting, the candidate will simultaneously choose the platform and
invest in valence as to maximize her payoff. The fraction of the population voting for
candidate i is now given by
x˜i =
ui + uj
2
+
λi − λj
2β
, (16)
where ui,j ∈ (0, 1) denote the platform choices of the two candidates. Again, since the
game is symmetric, and the location and valence choices are independent, we need to an-
alyze only the behavior of one candidate. As noted in the beginning, it is reasonable to
assume that the candidate faces a trade–off between locating itself closer to the median of
the voters’ distribution and raising resources to invest in valence. We justify this assump-
tion by the findings of Serra (2010) and McCarty et al. (2006), who link the increasing
amount of resources spent on campaigning to political polarization, and hypothesize that
candidates face a trade-off between raising resources from donors when they polarize and
moving towards the median voter: by moving away from the ideal point the candidate
loses resources necessary for campaigning, but gains additional electoral support. As we
do not model directly the budget constraints of the candidates, we must be careful about
this interpretation. An alternative interpretation that avoids potential complications as-
sociated with modeling the budget constraint, is to understand the cost of platform as a
disutility the candidate suffers by moving away from his ideals. Additionally, the cost of
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platform change may comprise the actual menu costs of platform changes. In the model
the cost increases along with moving away from zi = 0 for candidate i and zj = 1 for
candidate j. The choice of ui is, therefore costly with Cui > 0 and Cui,ui > 0. We do
not make any assumption about the sign of CIi,ui , as whether platforms and valence are
cost substitutes or complements cannot by unambiguously determined. Given the resource
constraint interpretation and the disutility interpretation of the cost of platform of Serra
(2010), investments in valence and platforms are substitutes (in fact Serra (2010) imposes a
additively separable cost functions of parties). Yet, if a cost of a platform choice comprises
the menu costs of platform changes, high valence candidates might have an advantage in
this aspect (e.g. an experienced candidate might have a comparative advantage on running
his office over a newcomer), in which case valence investment and platform change costs
are complements. This relation clearly depends on the interpretation of the cost as well as
a type of valence investment and could be established empirically.
Notice that if the locations can be chosen at no cost, an equilibrium cannot exist in our
set–up. If this was the case, parties would immediately choose positions at the median, and
the investment in valence would be infinite. As we will see later on, in fact, an equilibrium
of the model with costly locations cannot be ”too” convergent by the same reasoning.
The current–value Hamiltonians for this problem are given by
J˜i = x˜i − C(Ii, xi, ui) + µi(Ii − δλi) + µj(Ij − δλj) (17)
J˜j = 1− x˜i − C(Ij, (1− xi), (1− uj)) + µi(Ii − δλi) + µj(Ij − δλj) (18)
The first order conditions for candidate i yield now
µi = CIi (19a)
1/2 = Cui (19b)
µ˙i = µi(δ + ρ)− 1
2β
(1− Cxi) (19c)
λ˙i = Ii − δλi (19d)
µ˙j =
1
2β
(1− Cxi) + µj(δ + ρ) (19e)
and are sufficient if the determinant of−CIi,Ii 0 −CIi,ui0 − 1
(2β)2
Cxi,xi 0
−CIi,ui 0 −Cui,ui

is nonpositive, which is true if (CIi,ui)
2 − Cui,uiCIi,Ii < 0, which is a standard assumption
present in capital accumulation games of the kind analyzed here (compare with Caputo
(2005)). Again, it is clear that the sign of the cost interaction partial derivative does not
matter for the further analysis, but only the relative magnitude of the cost effects.
Totally differentiating (19a) and (19b) with respect to time, and substituting into (19c),
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yields after rearrangement:
I˙i =
Cui,ui(1− Cxi − 2CIiβ(δ + ρ))
2[(CIi,ui)
2 − Cui,uiCIi,Ii ]β
(20a)
λ˙i = Ii − δλi (20b)
Given (20a), the only possibility for I˙ to be zero, is under the assumption of strict con-
vexity of the cost function with respect to ui, that the second parenthesis is zero. Together
with the first order condition on ui, the steady–state investment level and positions can be
found by solving
0 = 1− Cxi − 2CIiβ(δ + ρ) (21)
1/2 = Cui (22)
From the assumptions on strict monotonicity of the cost function with respect to I and
u, we see that the solution is unique. By the implicit function theorem
du∗
dI
< 0, (23)
that is the platforms converge towards the median along with increasing equilibrium in-
vestments in valence. This happens also if the choice of platform and investment in valence
are complements in terms of costs, as the relative magnitude of this effect is small (recall
(CIi,ui)
2−Cui,uiCIi,Ii < 0) and since from the perspective of the voters’ utility valence and
platforms are strategic substitutes.
Again using symmetry for the dynamics of Ij and λj, the Jacobian matrix of the system
evaluated at the steady–state is
J =

dI˙i
dIi
0 dI˙i
dλi
dI˙i
dλj
0
dI˙j
dIj
dI˙j
dλi
dI˙j
dλj
1 0 −δ 0
0 1 0 −δ

|I˙i=0,λ˙i=0,Cui=1/2
, (24)
where
dI˙i
dIi
= 2CIi,IiCui,uiβ(δ + ρ)
dI˙j
dIj
= 2CIj ,IjC1−uj ,1−ujβ(δ + ρ)
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dI˙i
dλi
=
−Cui,uiCxi,xi
(2β2)[(CIi,ui)
2 − Cui,uiCIi,Ii ]
dI˙i
dλj
=
Cui,uiCxi,xi
(2β2)[(CIi,ui)
2 − Cui,uiCIi,Ii ]
dI˙j
dλj
=
−C1−uj ,1−ujCxi,xi
(2β2)[(CIj ,uj)
2 − C1−uj ,1−ujCIj ,Ij ]
dI˙j
dλi
=
C1−uj ,1−ujCxi,xi
(2β2)[(CIj ,1−uj)2 − C1−uj ,1−ujCIj ,Ij ]
Saddle–path stable solution exists under the assumptions about the cost functions, it is easy
to see that one of the eigenvalues is equal −δ, whereas the other three have complicated
forms4.
Since, the game irrespective of the complicated form of the cost structure, is still linear
in the state and there are no multiplicative interactions between the state and the controls,
the open–loop solution is Markov perfect and by the argument stated in Section 2.4, it is
also a solution to a model with probabilistic voting entering as a white noise.
Proposition 3. The set of solutions to (19a)–(19e) together with an appropriate transver-
sality condition constitute a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium of the game in question.
Moreover, the solution is also a Markov perfect equilibrium of a game for which the state
equation is given in (15).
3.2. Comparative statics and dynamics, and testable predictions
We can apply the Cramer’s rule to find the sensitivity of the steady state location choices
and investment levels to the parameters of the model. The signs of the derivatives depend
on whether valence investments and platform choices are complements or substitutes. The
following holds if valence investment and platform choices are substitutes: the location
choice ui is increasing in β:
du∗i
dβ
= − CIiCIi,ui
β[(CIi,ui)
2 − Cui,uiCIi,Ii ]
> 0, (25)
that is the parties tend toward the median for higher values of the parameter reflecting the
sensitivity of the voters to the policy message5. Similarly,
dI∗i
dβ
< 0. (26)
4Exact derivations of the values of the eigenvalues is available from the author on request.
5Notice that signs of derivatives of u∗ for the second player will be the opposite, as direction towards
the median corresponds to decreasing u
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As the marginal return to λi,j is equal to
1
2β
, the opportunity cost of investment in valence
is higher if voters react strongly to the policy message.
The magnitude of β depends on many factors. The are clear differences between con-
stituencies across countries and elections as shown e.g. by Schofield and Jeon (2010),
Schofield et al. (2010b), Schofield et al. (2010a) and Turyna (2010). β is also expected to
differ across issues within the same election and constituency: for salient issues voters react
more strongly to the platform of a candidate compared to other characteristics. The loca-
tion choice and investment level also depend on the speed of depreciation of the political
capital. We have
du∗i
dδ
> 0 (27)
and
dI∗i
dδ
< 0. (28)
The candidates tend towards the median instead on investing in valence, whenever valence
depreciates quickly, that is for high values of δ: investment in valence in this case does
not lead to a long–term increase in the electoral support. Speed of depreciation of valence
is again dependent on the type of investment in mind. As noticed in the introduction,
persuasive advertisement is known to depreciate slowly compared to other sorts of electoral
messages. Yet, speed of depreciation of an investment of a candidate in his education or
experience could depend on many factors, which can be explored in further research on
this issue.
If valence investment and platform choice cost are complementary the signs of all derivatives
change. A further empirical study could explore the question of the actual cost relation.
Intuitively, one should find a negative relation between β and persuasive campaign activity,
but a positive one if we interpret valence as experience in running the office, as exemplified
in the introduction.
To understand the results even more clearly, we apply the dynamic envelope theorem of
Caputo, to analyze the sensitivity of the accumulated variables to the parameters of the
model. Denoting V (t; β, δ) the value of the maximized Hamiltonian – evaluated at the
optimal path, the following holds
Vβ(β, δ) = −1
2
T∫
0
λ(t)
β2
dt ≤ 0 (29)
and
Vδ(β, δ) = −
T∫
0
µ(t)λ(t)dt ≤ 0, (30)
since µ(t) = const. > 0 and λ(t) ≥ 0. These results mean that the accumulated value
of the investment is decreasing both in β and δ. This dependence of the value function
on the β parameter sheds new light on the question of the impact of issue salience on
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platform choices. Since the value of running for office is lower when β is high, it might
be a reasonable strategy of a candidate to try to influence the importance of policy to the
voters relative to them being subject to campaign persuasion. This question clearly calls
for further investigation.
To evaluate the second derivatives with respect ot the parameters, we can for the case of
β use Corollary 11.2 of Caputo (2005) and conclude that the since the objective function
is convex in β and β does not appear in the state transition equation, the value function
V is convex in β and it holds that
Vβ,β(β, δ) = −1
2
 T∫
0
∂λ(t)
∂β
β−2dt− 2
T∫
0
λ(t)β−3dt
 ≥ 0. (31)
This expression does not give an unambiguous answer as for the sign of the second
derivative, nevertheless it represents the comparative dynamics of the value function with
respect to the β parameter. As for the impact of δ on the value function, we cannot use
the above result, since δ appears in the transition equation. We apply directly Theorem
11.2 of Caputo (2005) and it follows that
Lδ,δ = −
T∫
0
[
Hδ,λ
∂λ(t)
∂δ
+Hδ,µ
∂µ(t)
∂δ
]
dt =
T∫
0
µ(t)
∂λ(t)
∂δ
+ λ(t)
∂µ(t)
∂δ
dt ≤ 0 (32)
Since the second component of the sum is zero, it follows that
∂λ(t)
∂δ
≤ 0,
that is the accumulated valence is decreasing in the depreciation rate.
4. Strictly increasing cost of electoral support
So far we have analyzed the case of zero or linear cost of electoral support. If the
cost of electoral support is strictly increasing some of the conclusions from the previous
sections do not hold. In particular, the open-loop solutions found in (13) and (21) and the
comparative statics are still valid, but the solution is not necessarily Markov perfect, as for
the case of strictly increasing cost of xi the state and the controls of the two players interact
multiplicatively. For the case of general cost functions it is difficult to find a closed–loop
solution. Additionally, the comparative dynamics of the system have to be revised, since
it is no longer true that the candidates choose a constant level of investment in valence:
the multiplicative interaction implies dependence of Ii on λi. Determinant of (24) is in
any case negative, therefore a saddle path solution exists. In order to find a closed–form
solution of the feedback equilibrium, we assume a quadratic cost function of the form:
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pii =
ui + uj
2
+
λi − λj
2β
− 1
2
x2i −
1
2
I2i .−
γ
2
u2i (33)
We conjecture a value function of the form
V i = a0 + a1λi + a2λj +
a3
2
λ2j +
a4
2
λ2j + a5λiλj + a6ui + a7(1− uj) +
a8
2
u2i +
a9
2
(1− uj)2+
a10ui(1− uj) + a11uiλi + a12(1− uj)λj + a13(1− uj)λi + a14uiλj (34)
Additionally we make a simplifying assumption that β = 2 and ρ = 0.5, so that we can
concentrate on the effect of the depreciation parameter on the locations of parties. The
value function has to satisfy the HJB equation6:
ρV i(λi, λj, ui, uj) = max
ui,Ii
{pii + V iλi(λi, λj)[Ii − δλi] + V iλj(λi, λj)[φj(λi, λj)− δλj]} (35)
The steady–state level of valence λ and positions of parties in a symmetric equilibrium
are
λCLi,j =
γ
(
1 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
)
2δ
(
1 + 4γ + 4(1 + γ)δ + 8(1 + γ)δ2 + (1 + γ)
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
) (36)
uCLi =
1 + 4δ + 8δ2 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
2
(
1 + 4γ + 4(1 + γ)δ + 8(1 + γ)δ2 + (1 + γ)
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
) (37)
uCLj = 1−
1 + 4δ + 8δ2 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
2
(
1 + 4γ + 4(1 + γ)δ + 8(1 + γ)δ2 + (1 + γ)
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
) . (38)
Similarly to the open–loop case, it holds that
duCLi
dδ
> 0
and
duCLi
dγ
< 0,
that is the equilibrium is more convergent for higher values of the depreciation rate and
lower values of the location choice cost. The opposite holds for the equilibrium value of
investment in valence. Using results of Section 3, we can compare this result to the open–
loop equilibrium with increasing cost of electoral support. Substitution of the quadratic
6Derivation of the solution is provided in the appendix
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cost function into (21) yields
λOLi,j =
1 + 8γδ(1 + 2δ)
2δ(1 + 2δ) (1 + 4γ + 8(1 + γ)δ + 16(1 + γ)δ2)
(39)
uOLi =
−1 + 8(−1 + γ)δ(1 + 2δ)
2γ (1 + 4γ + 8(1 + γ)δ + 16(1 + γ)δ2)
(40)
uOLj = 1−
(1 + 4δ)2 + 8γ (1 + 3δ + 6δ2)
2γ (1 + 4γ + 8(1 + γ)δ + 16(1 + γ)δ2)
. (41)
For all possible values of δ the closed–loop solution is more convergent than the open–
loop. The effect on the investment in equilibrium is ambiguous, as it depends on the
relation between the cost of platform choice γ and the depreciation rate δ. We are able to
establish numerically that the closed–loop level of investment is higher than the open–loop
for δ > 1/2 and γ > 1/2, that is the relationship holds for the empirically relevant values
of the depreciation parameter.
5. Conclusions
In this work, we have presented a dynamic two–party spatial competition model in
which parties simultaneously choose locations and invest in valence. We found that the
positions of parties diverge from the median if the parameter measuring the importance
of policy relative to valence β is decreasing and if the political capital depreciates slowly.
Although the current literature offers results as for the relationship between the β, and
valences of parties, it concentrates on the differences in valences between the candidates.
In our setting, in the steady–state, parties choose the same level of investment, thus they
have the same valence, yet they adopt divergent positions. This results from the fact that
the benefits of investment in valence and of investment in a location are interrelated and
determined endogenously in the model. An innovative result of this model, which cannot
be captured in a static set–up is the effect of valence depreciation and discount factor on the
positions of parties. If valence depreciates quickly, parties will tend to locate themselves
closer to the median. This result reveals an important difference between a two–party
system and a multiparty system. In a system such as the U.S. Congress, political capital
of individual candidates depreciates quickly, since those who lose the election disappear
completely from the political scene at least for a while. This is generally not true for
the case of elections in Europe, where individual candidates of parties change, but the
composition of the parties remains fairly constant over time and the political image of a
party as a whole is much more important than the individual traits of the candidates.
European parties can adopt more divergent positions, and exhaust a gathered political
capital for a longer period of time.
Another implication of the effect of the depreciation parameter on polarization is asso-
ciated with the observation about polarization increasing in the U.S. Congress in the last
decades. A reason for that, as predicted by our model, could be parties becoming more
polarized as a result of the political capital depreciating more slowly these days as com-
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pared to the past decades. Nowadays, the persuasive electoral campaigning has become
an enormous professionalized industry having access to various tools of modern technology
and research on human cognition and marketing. Professional politicians can tailor their
campaigning messages very well to the taste of the society, and use tools like Twitter of
Facebook to reach the voters directly. The scope of the marketing tools available has been
constantly raising over the last decades. It seems that a costless message on Twitter can
have a more significant effect on the electoral support than a costly travel around the
country organizing campaign trails. With the same resources available, parties nowadays
can influence the electorate more strongly than 40 years ago. The political capital depre-
ciates more slowly: with access to tailored marketing and almost costless tools of instant
marketing on the Internet, the brand name ”does not have the time to depreciate”.
In this paper, we introduced a new tool for analyzing electoral outcomes and behavior
of office–motivated candidates. Most public choice literature concentrates on stage games,
static signaling games as well as bargaining problems. We believe, that a great number
of topics in electoral competition can be mostly naturally modelled as a differential game.
Whenever parties or contributors involve in a dynamic process of capital accumulation
(political capital, campaign contributions or alike) a structure of a capital accumulation
game, similar to presented in this work seems a natural tool to explore. Additionally, other
problems of collective choice could well be addressed with this method: similarly to what
has been for many years explored in environmental and resource economics and modelled
as differential common pool resources games. Formal models of electoral competition, cam-
paigning, collective action and electoral behavior could explore so far unrevealed dynamic
features by referring to the class of differential games as a tool of choice.
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Appendix
Derivation of the closed–loop solution for the case of increasing cost of electoral support.
The value function has to satisfy the HJB equation:
ρV i(λi, λj, ui, uj) = max
ui,Ii
{pii + V iλi(λi, λj)[Ii − δλi] + V iλj(λi, λj)[φj(λi, λj)− δλj]} (42)
Maximization of the RHS yields
Ii = φi(λi, λj, ui, uj) = V
i
λi
(λi, λj, ui, uj) = a1 + a3λi + a5λj + a11ui + (1− a13uj) (43a)
Ij = φj(λi, λj, ui, uj) = V
j
λj
(λi, λj, ui, uj) = a1 + a3λj + a5λi + a11(1− uj) + a13ui (43b)
V iλj = a2 + a4λj + a5λi + a12(1− uj) + a14ui (43c)
Ii = − 1
a11
{1/2 + a12a13 + a1a14 + a11a14 + a13a2 + (−1/2− a12a13 − a11a14)uj+ (43d)
(−1/2 + 2a13a14 − γ)ui + (−1/4 + a13a5 + a14a5 − a11δ)λi+
(1/4 + a14a3 + a13a4− a14δ)λj}
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Substitution of (43a)-(43c) into the HJB equation, yields a set of equations
0 = a0/2− a21/2− a1a12 − a11a12 − a1a13 − a213/2− a1a2 − a11a2 + a7/2 + a9/4 (44a)
0 = −1/2 + a1a12 + 2a11a12 + a1a13 + a213 + a11a2 − a7/2− a9/2 (44b)
0 = 1/8− a11a12 − a213/2 + a9/4 (44c)
0 = −1/2 + a10/2− a1a11 − a11a13 − a12a13 − a1a14 − a11a14 − a13a2 + a6/2 (44d)
0 = 1/4− a10/2 + a11a13 + a12a13 + a11a14 (44e)
0 = 1/8− a211/2− a13a14 + a8/4 + γ/2 (44f)
0 = 1/4 + a12/2 + a2/2− a12a3 − a2a3 − a1a4 − a11a4 − a1a5 − a13a5 + a12δ + a2δ (44g)
0 = −1/8− a12/2 + a12a3 + a11a4 + a13a5 − a12δ (44h)
0 = −1/8 + a14/2− a14a3 − a13a4 − a11a5 + a14δ (44i)
0 = 1/32 + a4/4− a3a4 − a25/2 + a4δ (44j)
0 = −1/4 + a1/2 + a13/2− a1a3 − a13a3 − a1a5 − a11a5 − a12a5 − a2a5 + a1δ + a13δ
(44k)
0 = 1/8− a13/2 + a13a3 + a11a5 + a12a5 − a13δ (44l)
0 = 1/8 + a11/2− a11a3 − a13a5 − a14a5 + a11δ (44m)
0 = −1/16 + a5/2− 2a3a5 − a4a5 + 2a5δ (44n)
0 = 1/32 + a3/4− a23/2− a25 + a3δ (44o)
There are six solutions that satisfy equations (44a)–(44o)7. Out of these, stability requires
that the eigenvalues of the dynamic system resulting from manipulation of (43a) to (43d)
are negative, which is satisfied by one of the solutions:
7The exact derivation of the solutions is available from the author upon request.
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a0 = 1/2 (45)
a1 = 0 (46)
a2 = 0 (47)
a3 = δ +
1
12
(
3− 2(1 + 4δ)−
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
)
(48)
a4 =
1
12
(
1 + 4δ −
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
)
(49)
a5 =
1
12
(
−1− 4δ +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
)
(50)
a6 = 0 (51)
a7 = 0 (52)
a8 =
3− 4δ(1 + 2δ) (3 + 4δ + 8δ2)− 2γ (3 + 4δ + 8δ2)2 − 3√7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(3 + 4δ + 8δ2)2
(53)
a9 =
3− 4δ(1 + 2δ) (3 + 4δ + 8δ2)− 3√7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(3 + 4δ + 8δ2)2
(54)
a10 =
4δ(1 + 2δ) (3 + 4δ + 8δ2) + 3
(
−1 +√7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ))
(3 + 4δ + 8δ2)2
(55)
a11 = − 1
1 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(56)
a12 = − 1
1 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(57)
a13 =
1
1 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(58)
a14 =
1
1 +
√
7 + 8δ(1 + 2δ)
(59)
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